A Health Economics Thought Experiment

A tight worked economics argument: ethical rules forbidding doctors from prioritizing patients by insurance, combined with the freedom not to enroll with an insurer at all, perversely incentivize doctors to drop low-paying insurance entirely — so the poor get seen LESS than under naked triage, and the doctor pockets more for less work. Extends it to the surgery-vs-office two-service case. Flagged as unverified (heard in a lecture).

Quality 64 · Strong. Strong, low: an original, numerate incentive analysis that punches above its length with a genuinely counterintuitive result; capped by the explicit 'haven't verified this' caveat and its brevity. 64.

Claude’s paradigm shift 48 · Moderate. Moderate: the perverse-incentive-of-anti-discrimination-rules result is a fresh, non-obvious point. 48.

Real-world impact 1 · Negligible. A blog thought-experiment; no material reach. RWI 1.